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In a public service announcement on March 17, 2016, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) jointly with the 
Department of Transportation and the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, released a warning over the increasing 
vulnerability of motor vehicles to remote exploits1. Engine 
shutdown, disable brakes and door locks are few examples of the 
possible vehicle cyber security attacks. Modern cars grow into 
a new target for cyberattacks as they become increasingly 
connected. While driving on the road, sharks (i.e., hackers) only 
need to be within communication range of your vehicle to attack 
it. However, in some cases, they can hack into it while they are 
miles away. In this article, we aim to illuminate the latest vehicle 
cyber security threats including malware attacks, On-Board 
Diagnostic (OBD) vulnerabilities, and auto mobile apps threats. 
We illustrate the In-Vehicle network architecture and 
demonstrate the latest defending mechanisms that are designed 
to mitigate such threats. 
Introduction 
Nowadays, vehicles are no longer isolated mechanical 
machines that are solely used for transportation. Consumers are 
increasingly demanding a seamless connected experience in all 
aspects of their lives including driving. With the introduction of 
telematics, vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to infrastructure 
(V2I) communications, and the integration of smart phones and 
Bluetooth devices, connected vehicles represent an eco-system 
that is part of a fully connected world. In fact, connected vehicles 
are an integral part of the smart city vision and a node in the 
world of Internet of Things (IoT). On the other side, vehicles 
themselves are now controlled by hundreds of Electrical Control 
Units (ECUs) that form an internal network of devices within the 
vehicle. While increasing autonomy and connectivity in vehicles 
bring many improvements in terms of functionality and 
convenience, it also brings a new cyber threat plane into life 
where vehicles become a new target for attackers/hackers [1]. 
As software starts to permeate more functions in the modern 
vehicles that are Internet connected, we propose to play the 
following game of words: 1) If you see the word “software”, 
                                                                  
1 Internet Crime Complaint Centre (IC3) | Motor Vehicles Increasingly 
Vulnerable to Remote Exploits, Mar. 17, 2016. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.ic3.gov/media/2016/160317.aspx   
replace it with “hackable”; and 2) If you see the word 
“connected”, replace it with “exposed”. As it stands, you can 
imagine that while driving your “hackable exposed” modern car, 
you are surrounded by sharks. These sharks try to attack and/or 
hack into your vehicle and may cause a real damage that cannot 
be recovered. Since it is a life-threatening issue (i.e., considered 
as a lethal cyberattack), in April 2016, the Michigan state Senate 
has proposed two bills that introduce life sentences in prison for 
people who hack into vehicles’ electronic systems [2].  
 
Figure 1 Hackers remotely kill a Cherokee Jeep on highway with 
the driver in it using a simple 3G connection [3] 
Figure 1 shows an example of a demonstrated cyber 
security attack against a Cherokee Jeep car on a highway, also 
known as cyber carjacking. In July 2015, two researchers 
Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek hacked into the Cherokee Jeep 
from Miller’s basement while the car itself was placed on the 
highway ten miles away [3]. They were able to remotely control 
the car functions using a simple 3G connection exploiting a 
vulnerability in the Uconnect software. Uconnect is Internet 
connected software that controls the navigation and the 
entertainment system in the vehicle. Through the discovered 
Uconnect’s cellular vulnerability, which represents the attacking 
entry point, they had the ability to rewrite the firmware of the 
adjacent chip in the car’s head unit. Consequently, they sent 
commands through the In-vehicle network, which is illustrated 
in the next section, to disable the brakes and take control over 
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the steer wheel, and finally sent it to a ditch as showed in Figure 
1. This cyber carjacking incident caused the recall of 1.4 million 
cars. 
In fact, it is not only the problem of Chrysler vehicles with 
Uconnect software. There are other attacks that have been 
recently reported against other manufacturers’ vehicles. 
Examples of the most recent reported attacks are: 
• Last summer, June 2016, the Mitsubishi Outlander Plug in 
Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV) was hacked. Security 
researchers at Pentest Partners [4] performed a man in the 
middle attack between the PHEV’s mobile app and the 
PHEV’s Wi-Fi Access Point (AP). After replaying various 
messages from the mobile app, they figured out the binary 
protocol used for messaging. Consequently, they were able 
to turn the lights on and off and disable the whole theft 
alarm system leaving the vehicle vulnerable to more 
attacks. 
• Garcia et al. [5] showed that almost 100 million 
Volkswagen vehicles sold between 1995 and 2016 are 
vulnerable to remote keyless entry hacks. Volkswagen 
vehicles depend on few global master keys that can be 
recovered from ECUs. This way, the attacker can clone a 
Volkswagen Group remote control and, by eavesdropping 
on a single signal sent by the original remote, he/she can 
gain unauthorised access to the vehicle.    
• Through a vulnerability in NissanConnect mobile 
application, which controls Nissan Leaf electric vehicle, 
attackers took control over the heater in the car and turned 
it on all the time to drain the battery. This incident forced 
Nissan to disable that application [6]. 
• An attacker within the SmartGate in-car Wi-Fi range of the 
SmartGate-enabled Škoda car can steal information about 
the car [7]. Moreover, he/she can lock out the car’s owner 
from the SmartGate system.  
• Finally, using a laser pointer and a Raspberry PI, Jonathan 
Petit, a security researcher, was able to interfere with the 
laser ranging (LIDAR) systems of the self-driving car to 
trick it into thinking that there are obstacles (i.e., other cars 
or pedestrians) ahead of it [8]. This trick can bring a self-
driving car at full speed to stop thus, disabling the car. Self-
driving cars depend on LIDAR systems, which create a 3D 
map, to navigate and see if there is any potential hazard or 
obstacle as can be seen in Figure 2. Petit simply fired his 
laser pointer, which is pulsed by the Raspberry PI, at the 
self-driving car. When it is picked up, the LIDAR unit is 
tricked into seeing illusory objects when turning right. 
Consequently, the car stopped at once. This attack worked 
up to 100m away in any direction and did not require a 
tightly focused beam.  
Hence, physical access to the car is no longer a pre-
condition to hack into it. Sharks on the road only need to be in 
communication range of the targeted vehicle (e.g., its Wi-Fi 
range) to gain important information and even take control of the 
vehicle’s most critical functions. However, in some cases like in 
the Uconnect software attack, the sharks can be miles away from 
the targeted vehicle. Besides taking over control of the steer 
wheel and disabling brakes, a simple and sudden airbags 
deployment while driving on a highway represents a lethal 
cyberattack that could cause the vehicle to crash and costs lives. 
 
 
Figure 2 What a self-driving car sees when turning right [8] 
In practice, besides recalling the vulnerable cars and 
offering Over-The-Air (OTA) updates, the auto industry should 
respond in a better way to avoid embarrassing hacks and costly 
recalls. The last reported incidents were the motive for a series 
of events that brought together many car manufacturers along 
with law agencies and governmental bodies (e.g., see [9]). The 
aim of these events was to put an effective strategy to share 
information, raise threat awareness across the auto industry, 
listen to consumers’ concerns about security and privacy, learn 
about the required legalisations, and put vehicle IT at the centre 
of the development process. Yet, more efforts are needed to 
address vehicle cyber security concerns.  
In-Vehicle Network Architecture (Automotive 
Network)  
To develop an understanding of the potential entry points 
(i.e., attacking points) the hackers can expose in the modern car, 
in this section, we illustrate the In-vehicle network architecture, 
also known as the automotive network, in detail.  
Modern cars contain between 30 to 100 ECUs, which are 
embedded computers, that communicate among each other 
creating the In-vehicle network [10]. ECUs’ inter-
communication is essential to efficiently monitor and configure 
different vehicular subsystems. Figure. 3 shows that the In-
vehicle network is composed of many electronic subsystems 
including embedded telematics, body and comfort control, 
vehicle safety, powertrain, on-board video cameras and In-
Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) [11]. Each subsystem contains many 
ECUs each of which controls a specific functionality in the 
vehicle. For instance, ECUs that control airbags deployment and 
Antilock Braking System (ABS) are found in the vehicle safety 
subsystem, while ECUs that provide engine control and 
suspension control are found in the powertrain subsystem. 
 
Figure 3 In-Vehicle (Automotive) Network Architecture [11] 
To guarantee the desired functionality and on-time response 
to critical events, ECUs of the same or different subsystems need 
to communicate among each other. Based on the time-sensitivity 
of the provided functionality, different In-vehicle sub-networks 
are utilised. For instance, high-speed Control Area Network 
(CAN) is used for time-critical engine control, safety 
subsystems, and powertrain, while for less time-sensitive body 
and comfort control subsystem a Local Interconnect Network 
(LIN) is used [11]. To support audio, video and on-board 
cameras, Media-Oriented Systems Transport (MOST) and 
Ethernet are employed in the IVI subsystem. These networks are 
interconnected through gateways that control messages flow 
among the subsystems as showed in Figure. 3. At the same time, 
these gateways are interconnected through a high-speed CAN 
buses. 
Given the recent trends of connecting different devices 
through USB, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, 3G/4G etc., each In-vehicle 
network subsystem implements its own communication module 
to connect to the outside world. For instance, IVI allows both 
wireless communication through Bluetooth and wired 
communication through USB. Cellular communication is 
implemented in the embedded telematics subsystem that can 
offer a Wi-Fi AP. Moreover, modern vehicles are now fitted with 
On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) ports that are utilised for vehicle 
inspection, ECU firmware updates and repair. Furthermore, 
OBD port allows full access to the In-vehicle network. 
Thus, the variety and the increasing number of connection 
points in each In-vehicle network subsystem make the vehicle 
more accessible from the outside world. Consequently, more 
vulnerable to different cyberattacks. Indeed, each 
communication interface with the outside world should be 
protected. However, protecting each entry point separately will 
result in duplicate securing functions on the same vehicle. 
Moreover, restrictions such as limited computational power and 
storage capabilities should be considered. 
Cyber Threats Vectors against Connected 
Vehicles 
As we have explained before, connected vehicles have a 
broad cyberattacks surface where attacker can gain control over 
the vehicle. Remote key entry, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Dedicated 
Short Range Communications (DSRC), OBD, USB, and Auto 
mobile apps are few examples of attacks entry points against 
connected vehicles as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Connected Vehicles Security – Potential Cyber Threat 
Vectors 
In the following, we explain four cyber threats vectors 
against connected vehicles: OBD threats, DSRC security issues, 
malware attacks, and mobile auto apps threats. 
OBD Threats 
The implementation of OBD is mandatory in vehicles sold 
in the US since 1996, in the European Union since 2001 for 
gasoline powered-vehicles, and for the diesel-powered ones 
since 2004 [10]. The OBD port is primarily used to allow cars to 
report any problem in its infrastructure and communicate the 
diagnostic data collected by its sensors to the outside world. This 
allows the service provider to fix the reported problems. OBD 
dongles are used to interface with the OBD port and 
consequently access the CAN network within the vehicle. These 
OBD dongles can be purchased by anyone and they are fairly 
cheap. OBD ports are considered as entry points to attack the 
ECUs that are connected to the CAN buses. The authors in [12] 
showed how an automotive virus can be injected into the ECUs 
through the OBD port and trigger specific messages on the bus 
(e.g., door locks) when specific conditions are met. 
While the above-mentioned attack in [12] requires physical 
access to the vehicle, modern cars now allow OBD dongles to 
be remotely controlled by Wi-Fi connection from a computer. In 
[13], vulnerabilities in the API of a pass-thru device (i.e., OBD 
dongle) allow the attacker to inject a malicious code into it. This 
malicious code makes the pass-thru device emitting malicious 
packets on the CAN buses every time it is plugged into a 
different vehicle. In a recent survey [14], over 50% of the 
surveyed OBD dongles, are vulnerable to hacking. Weak 
encryption, exposed keys, and communication hijacking are the 
top three security flaws in these dongles.  
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DSRC Security Issues 
V2V and V2I communications are key technologies to offer 
a class of safety services for connected vehicles that can prevent 
collisions and save lives. DSRC technology has been developed 
for use in V2V and V2I communications, where each vehicle is 
assumed to be equipped with DSRC On-Board Unit (OBU). 
DSRC communications utilise several standards such as IEEE 
802.11p Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) 
for PHY and MAC functions, IEEE 1609.2 for security services, 
and IEEE 1609.3 for network services.  
To achieve its goal, DSRC equipped vehicles are expected 
to communicate (i.e., send/receive/relay) information to other 
DSRC equipped vehicles and/or infrastructure such as Road-
Side Units (RSU). This principle opens the door for malicious 
nodes to either hack into DSRC equipped vehicle or cause 
damages by sending fake safety information. Therefore, IEEE 
1609.2 defines standard mechanisms to authenticate and encrypt 
messages in DSRC. Nevertheless, attacks such as Denial-of-
Service (DoS) are still possible. In [15], Lyamin et al. 
investigated the jamming DoS attacks in IEEE 802.11p when a 
malicious node corrupts the exchanged safety messages in a 
platoon. Furthermore, they proposed a simple real-time detector 
of jamming DoS attacks in vehicular networks.  
Besides jamming DoS attacks, malware, GPS spoofing, 
location tracking, masquerading, and black holes are few 
examples of threats to DSRC equipped vehicles. Hence, more 
research efforts in collaboration with the auto industry are 
needed to mitigate such attacks. 
Malware Attacks 
Malware can affect the connected vehicle in many ways. It 
can exploit known vulnerabilities in the design and 
implementation of In-vehicle network subsystems and 
components, the software update packages of ECUs, and the 
vulnerabilities in the operating systems used in the vehicle. The 
amount of malicious actions that can be performed by malware 
is endless. For instance, malware can disrupt the normal 
operation of vehicle features such as locking the in-car radio so 
the users cannot turn it on, cause driver distractions by arbitrarily 
turning on the in-car audio and tuning the volume up, disable 
vehicle safety functions such as the ABS, lock the vehicle’s door 
and request a ransom to open it, and send fake safety data to 
other vehicles on the road [11]. 
In the connected vehicle, any communication interface can 
be a potential entry point for a malware. This includes OBD 
ports, remote ECU firmware and software updates (i.e., OTA), 
removable media ports, and embedded web browsers. It is worth 
noting that more vehicles are using Linux-based operating 
systems, which are more resilient to malware attacks than other 
operating systems like Microsoft Windows and Android. 
However, malware attacks on Linux have been on the rise [11]. 
Thus, we cannot assume that connected vehicles that are using 
Linux are completely immune to malware threats.  
Auto Mobile Apps Threats 
OEM-endorsed connected car solutions such as Apple’s 
CarPlay and Google’s Android Auto interfaces will bring more 
integrated, but potentially vulnerable, mobile apps into the 
connected vehicle [14]. Vehicles vendors are offering a wide 
range of auto mobile apps that leverage 3G/4G connections 
and/or Wi-Fi to communicate with your car and run diagnostic 
tests. However, these apps carry a lot of risk and security 
vulnerabilities that can cause personal data leakage and malware 
infection (e.g., the NissanConnect app vulnerability explained 
above). Besides that, a successful attack against a downloadable 
auto mobile application (e.g., inject a malicious code or plant a 
Trojan horse) in Apple Appstore or the Google Play Store would 
have serious consequences on the security of the connected 
vehicle, which may use that infected app. 
Moreover, it is noticeable that most of the recent reported 
attacks against connected vehicles have been conducted through 
an auto mobile app vulnerability. The method the mobile app 
uses to connect to the car plays a crucial role deciding how 
secure using this app is. Most auto mobile apps that allow remote 
access to the car utilise a web service hosted by a service 
provider. This web service then connects to the car using 3G/4G 
mobile data connection. However, some vehicles do not use 
cellular connections or web services. Instead, they allow mobile 
apps to connect directly to the car’s Wi-Fi AP and control its 
functions. If it is implemented poorly, this method is vulnerable 
to many security and privacy attacks such as geo-locating the 
vehicle using its AP SSID and capturing the Pre-Shared Key 
(PSK) between the car’s Wi-Fi AP and the mobile app. Hence, 
gaining unauthorised access to the vehicle’s functions as in the 
Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV hack [4], which was explained 
earlier.  
Defending/Protection Mechanisms  
While it is possible to use strong security measures and 
mechanisms in ordinary networks to protect it, the limited 
processing power of the In-vehicle network subsystems does not 
allow the same. Furthermore, ECUs usually come from different 
vendors. Thus, it is not feasible to design one security solution 
for the whole system. One suggestion is to isolate the In-vehicle 
physical network to make sure that infecting one subsystem will 
not affect the entire network.  However, this is not feasible with 
the increasing need for those subsystems to communicate among 
each other as explained via Figure. 3.  
Recently, three main approaches have emerged to 
protect/defend connected vehicles against cyber security threats, 
and respond as quickly as possible to the reported hacks. In the 
following, we illustrate these three approaches in detail.  
OTA Solution  
One of the biggest challenges that face the auto industry is 
to retrofit protection mechanisms in vehicles that were not 
secure or need to be secured against a recent threat/vulnerability. 
This may include software fixes, firmware upgrades, and 
security patches. To address this challenge and avoid costly 
recalls, more vehicles’ manufacturers start using the OTA 
updates.  
While OTA updates represent a reasonable solution to 
respond to cyber threats in connected vehicles, it suffers a major 
problem. Fixing vulnerabilities using OTA updates is a security 
risk. When OTA is delivered to the connected vehicle, it means 
that a remote code is allowed to execute. Thus, if security is not 
well implemented around the OTA updates, it can lead to serious 
consequences. Some security mechanisms such as 
authenticating the OTA update, use a secure protocol to deliver 
it, and cryptographically verify the OTA update must be in place. 
This is also called Secure OTA (SOTA), which has been the 
focus of many research efforts lately. 
Cloud-based Solutions  
Since it is not feasible to protect each In-vehicle subsystem 
individually, centralised solutions have emerged to protect the 
In-vehicle network and consequently the connected vehicle. For 
instance, Ericsson has developed a cloud-assisted solution called 
the Connected Vehicle Cloud (CVC) system [16]. The CVC 
system establishes a new channel between the vehicle and a 
variety of services and support provided by partners and OEM 
controlled partners. The security layer provided in CVC ensures 
that the communication between the vehicle and the system is 
encrypted. It also contains an anomaly detection unit to detect 
any malicious attempt to hack into the vehicle. Finally, through 
a secure gateway, CVC filters the contents of the web surfing 
traffic to make sure that no viruses or malwares could infect the 
vehicle. Figure 5 shows an overview of the CVC system.  
Figure 5 Ericsson Connected Vehicle Cloud Overview [16] 
In [11], Zhang et al. proposed a cloud-assisted vehicle 
malware defence framework since it is impractical to rely on the 
vehicle itself to defend against malware. The authors present 
lightweight malware defence functions, in terms of processing 
power and storage, that operate in the vehicle. With the 
assistance of a security cloud, the on-board malware defence 
functions will have full access to a wide range of malware 
defence mechanisms and an up-to-date large malware 
information database. This eliminates the limited storage 
problem in the In-vehicle network. It is also suggested that the 
traffic can be routed through the security cloud to filter out any 
viruses or malware before reaching the connected vehicle as in 
Ericsson CVC system [16].  
While the cloud-based solutions to secure connected 
vehicles look very promising, there are three main issues to 
examine. First, communications overhead and the delay incurred 
by routing the traffic through the cloud services need more 
investigation (e.g., routing V2V and V2I traffic to the cloud to 
defend against DSRC attacks is impractical). Secondly, these 
solutions heavily depend on the fact that the cloud-based 
systems are secure. However, if the cloud-based system is 
infected with a malware, it will spread to all its connected 
vehicles and could lead to severe damages. Finally, these 
solutions assumed that vehicles are connected to the cloud-based 
system all the time via the Internet. This may not be possible 
everywhere and would incur high costs for consumers.   
Layer-based Solution  
Finally, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) has launched a research programme 
that takes a layered approach to cyber security for motor vehicles 
[17]. According to NHTSA, this layered approach reduces the 
probability of attacks and mitigates the potential ramifications of 
a successful one. The programme focuses on four main areas at 
the vehicle level: 1) preventive measures and techniques such as 
isolation of safety critical subsystems to mitigate the effects of a 
successful attack; 2) real-time intrusion detection measures that 
include a continuous monitoring of potential intrusions in the 
system; 3) real-time response methods that aim to preserve the 
driver’s ability to control the vehicle when the attack is 
successful; and 4) assessment of solutions where information 
about successful hacks from partners can be collected and 
analysed to assess the effectiveness of the current protection 
mechanisms.  
Conclusion  
Vehicle cyber security is a very serious subject area that 
needs more investigation and research efforts from academia, 
auto industry and governmental bodies. Damages of automotive 
cyberattacks can be severe and irreversible as it concerns human 
lives. While manufacturers are looking to equip modern vehicles 
with more connectivity and smart functions, vulnerabilities are 
increasing rapidly. These vulnerabilities in wired and wireless 
communications interfaces allow sharks to hack into vehicles 
and take control. Some attempts to devise solutions to 
protect/defend connected vehicles and respond to reported hacks 
are very promising. However, more work and collaboration are 
still required to protect our connected vehicles and consequently 
our lives on the roads. 
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